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CLOSE CORPORATION LEGISLATION: A
SURVEY AND AN EVALUATIONt
F. HODGE O'NEAL*
Elvin R. Latty, before turning his energies to law school adminis-
tration, was the most innovative and resourceful of the pioneer drafts-
men of close corporation legislation. This article is dedicated to him
in recognition of the tremendous impact his thinking has had on the
development of such legislation.
This article first notes the general failure of legislatures, at least
before 1960, to differentiate in corporation statutes between close
corporations and public-issue corporations. It then discusses the
growing recognition of the distinctive needs and problems of close
corporations and the legislative efforts (many drawing on Dean
Latty's ideas) that have been made to meet these needs and cope with
these problems. Finally, it points out inadequacies in existing close
corporation legislation and makes suggestions for future lines of de-
velopment in legislation dealing with close corporations.
HISTORICAL FAILURE OF LEGISLATURES TO DIFFERENTIATE
BETWEEN CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC-ISSUE CORPORATIONS
Many corporate concepts and principles, undoubtedly created
with public-issue corporations primarily in mind, are ill-adapted to
close corporations. Although the nature and methods of operation of
the two kinds of corporations are utterly different, in the past and
especially before 1960 the corporation statutes generally set forth the
same rules for the governance of both public-issue and close corpora-
tions.' As one experienced attorney noted, a court normally had to
t This article is based on §§ 1.13-.14c of I F. H. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND
PRACTICE (2d ed. 1971).
* James B. Duke Professor of Law, Duke University. A.B. 1938, J.D. 1940, Louisiana State
University; J.S.D. 1949, Yale University; S.J.D. 1954, Harvard University.
I. The lack of a differentiation is graphically pointed out in Weiner, Legislative Recogni-
tion of the Close Corporation, 27 MICH. L. REv. 273 (1929). See also In re Klaus, 67 Wis.
401,406-07, 29 N.W. 582, 584 (1886). As early as the 1880's Professor Williston observed that
"[t]he most striking peculiarity found on first examination of the history of the law of business
corporations is the fact that different kinds of corporations are treated without distinction, and,
with few exceptions, as if the same rules were applicable to all alike." Williston, History of
the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, 2 HARV. L. REV. 105 (1888).
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answer each question concerning a close corporation "by struggling
to fit it into the pattern of statutory and case law developed for
corporations of largely different character."'2 In some states, little or
nothing has been done even in recent years to modify statutes unfa-
vorable to close corporations. 3
Prior to World War II, scholars working and writing in the field
of corporate law and most lawyers with a business practice seem to
have been oblivious to the special needs and problems of the close
corporation. Books of corporate forms, for example, contained abun-
dant specimen charters, by-laws, and other documents designed for
public-issue corporations but provided virtually no specimen docu-
ments adapted to close corporations. Even among the more experi-
enced corporate practitioners, only a rare lawyer really attempted to
tailor the corporate form to the distinctive needs of a closely held
enterprise.
PLEAS FOR CORRECTIVE LEGISLATION: DELAYS AND OPPOSITION
Great Britain and some of the countries of continental Europe
have long had special statutes governing the private company.' Since
World War II, strong pleas have been made urging the enactment in
this country of similar comprehensive statutes to govern close corpo-
rations, 5 and these pleas have become more frequent since the early
1950's.6
2. Scott, The Close Corporation in Contemporary Business, 13 Bus. LAW. 741, 743 (1958).
3. Because of restrictive or ambiguous statutes in such states, even an experienced and
resourceful corporation lawyer may find it difficult or impossible to set up with any assurance
of validity.the kind of control pattern participants in a close corporation may want. See Note,
Some Specific Needs of the Close Corporation Not Met Under the Minnesota Business Cor-
proation Act. Suggestions for Statutory Relief, 54 MINN. L. REv. 1008 (1970).
4. For a discussion of the British Act, see McFadyean, The American Close Corporation
and Its British Equivalent, 14 Bus. LAw. 215 (1958). See also Haskell, The American Close
Corporation and Its West German Counterpart: A Comparative Study, 21 ALA. L. REv. 287
(1969).
5. In particular, see Winer, Proposing a New York "Close Corporation Law," 28 CORNELL
L.Q. 313 (1943). One commentator has stated:
It would seem like an intelligent approach to the general problem of incorporation would
require at least three types of general incorporation laws in each state: One for the single
incorporator, another for the small concern, and a third for the extensive business setup,
for the purposes of mass production. Rutledge, Significant Trends in Modern Incorpora-
tion Statutes, 22 WASH. U.L.Q. 305, 339 (1937).
6. See Bradley, A Comparative Evaluation of the Delaware and Maryland Close Corpora-
tion Statutes, 1968 DuKE L.J. 525; Bradley, Towards a More Perfect Close Corporation- The
Need for More and Improved Legislation, 54 GEo. L.J. 1145 ( 1966); Ham, Suggestions for
Moderninzing the Kentucky General Corporation Law to Meet the Needs of Close Corpora-
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The legislative response of the states has been slow. Until about
1960, only a relatively few isolated provisions dealing with close cor-
poration problems had been added to the corporate statutes. Un-
doubtedly, one reason for this delay was the absence of any organized
group, adversely affected by the existing laws, which was capable of
exerting pressure on the legislatures.7 Unlike big business manage-
ment, which is well represented when changes are being made in
corporation statutes, small business owners, especially holders of
minority interests, usually do not play an important role in statutory
revisions.
Since 1960, a legislative breakthrough has occurred, with many
states adding to their corporate statutes provisions designed to meet
the more pressing close corporation problems. Even now, however,
only a handful of states have adopted a separate close corporation
statute. Most law revision committees have rejected the idea of a
completely separate legislative treatment of the close corporation
either in a new and distinct statute or in a separate chapter of the
business corporation statute. For example, the Corporation Law
Revision Commission of New Jersey, after much study, stated that
it had "determined, as have its counterparts in most states, that it was
not desirable to have a separate law govern the close corporation, as
distinct from all other corporations generally."'
The reasons for the rejection of separate treatment appear to be
threefold. First, legislatures have encountered difficulties in arriving
lions, 52 Ky. L.J. 527 (1964); Luna, Protection of Minority Interests Through Stockholders'
Agreements: A Commentary on Section 9 of the New York Stock Corporation Law, 28
PHILIPPINE L.J. 506, 535 (1953); Oppenheim, The Close Corporation in California-Necessity
of Separate Treatment, 12 HAST. L.J. 227 (1961); Powers, Cross Fire on the Close Corporation:
Norms Versus Needs, 11 U. FLA. L. REV. 433, 473 (1958); Wolens, A Round Peg-A Square
Hole: The Close Corporation and the Law, 22 Sw. L.J. 811 (1968); Note, The Need for
Legislative Recognition of Utah's Close Corporation, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 270.
In the Afterword to Note, A Plea for Separate Statutory Treatment of the Close Corpora-
tion, 33 N.Y.U.L. REV. 700 (1958), Professor Miguel A. De Capriles, focusing on the experi-
ence of New York, commented:
[A]s a matter of policy, there is no justification for a formalistic - perhaps one might
even say, sadistic-insistence upon an unnecessary and unsuitable internal structure or
operational organization as a condition of limited liability in the close corporation ...
To resolve these problems by the enactment of a special close corporation statute would,
in my judgment, be in the public interest. 33 N.Y.U.L. REV. 743, 745 (1958).
7. Hetherington, Special Characteristics, Problems and Needs of the Close Corporation,
1969 U. ILL. L.F. 1.
8. N.J. CORPORATION LAW REVISION COMM'N REPORT, reprinted in N.J. STAT. ANN.
14A:1-1, at xii (1969). See generally Kessler, Hooray (?)for the Model A ct- The 1969 Revision
and the Close Corporation, 38 FORD. L. REV. 743 (1970).
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at a satisfactory definition of the close corporation? This problem is
illustrated by the experience of the New York Joint Legislative Com-
mittee to Study Revision of the Corporation Laws, the committee
that drafted the New York Business Corporation Law. At the very
inception of the revision study, the Committee explored the desirabil-
ity of a separate "Close Business Corporation Law," but after inves-
tigation concluded that the close corporation could not be defined
with sufficient precision to delineate clearly between close corpora-
tions and public-issue corporations." A second reason for the failure
of legislatures to enact separate close corporation legislation is a fear
that separate legislation may bind close corporations to a small busi-
ness structure, thereby impeding their growth and hindering the grad-
ual evolution of the more successful of the closely held enterprises
into public-issue corporations. A third, undocumented reason for leg-
islative rejection of separate treatment is that members of the corpo-
ration bar serving as advisors or draftsmen for new corporation stat-
utes may have opposed separate legislative treatment of small incor-
porated enterprises because such treatment might tend to isolate the
giant companies politically (by depriving them of their identification
with politically potent small business) and thus might lead to separate
and more severe regulation and taxation for the huge corporations.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS WITH SOME UTILITY FOR CLOSE
CORPORATIONS
Even though most state legislatures have declined to enact sepa-
rate statutes for close corporations, the efforts of the writers who
have pleaded so eloquently for legislative recognition of the close
9. See N.Y. JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMm. To STUDY REVISION OF CORPORATION LAWS,
(FIRST) INTERIM REPORT, N.Y. LEGIS, Doc. No. 17, 180th Sess. 119-20 (1957), discussed in
Hoffman, New Horizons for the Close Corporation in New York Under Its New Business
Corporation Law, 28 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 2 (1961); Folk, The Model Act and the South
Carolina Corporation Law, 15 S.C.L. REV. 275, 282 (1963); Latty, The Close Corporation and
the New North Carolina Business Act, 34 N.C.L. REV. 432, 455-57 (1956).
As early as 1948, the New York Law Revision Commission struggled unsuccessfully with
the definitional problem. At one point the Commission stated that "no satisfactory way of
defining the genuine close corporation for purposes of a statute has ever been found," N.Y.
LAW REVISION COMM'N REP. 386 (1948). But see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 342 (Supp. 1968);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.70 (Supp. 1972); MD. ANN. CODE, art. 23, § 100 (Supp. 1971); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1372-74 (Supp. 1972). See generally F.H. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORA-
TIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.02 (1971).
10. See N.Y. JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMM. TO STUDY REVISION OF CORPORATION LAWS,
supra note 9, at 115-20; Hoffman, supra note 9, at 2.
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corporation have not been in vain. Corporation statutes enacted or
extensively revised since World War II typically contain a number
of provisions useful to lawyers organizing or counseling close corpo-
rations." Some of these statutory provisions, equally applicable to
close corporations and public-issue corporations, give an increased
flexibility to the corporate form and thus permit a tailoring of the
corporate device to the needs of closely held enterprises. Other provi-
sions, although in many instances not limited expressly to close cor-
porations,12 were drafted primarily to meet the needs of close corpo-
rations, and in practical operation apply largely, if not exclusively,
to such corporations.
Many of the new statutory provisions make the corporate form
more adaptable. Enactments in various states accomplish one or
more of the following: (1) authorize the use of optional clauses in a
corporation's charter 3 or special provisions in its by-laws;14 (2) per-
mit a corporation to be formed by a single incorporator; 5 (3) permit
a corporation to have less than the traditional minimum of three
directors; 6 (4) authorize high quorum and high vote requirements for
II. See Folk, Corporation Statutes: 1959-1966, 1966 DUKE L.J. 875, 947; O'Neal, Recent
Legislation Affecting Close Corporations, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 341 (1958). One com-
mentator has contended: "[T]he effect of most modern amendment programs dealing with
basic provisions of the corporation acts has been to modify them in the interest of the close
corporation. Our general corporation laws seem to be in the process of becoming general close
corporation laws with only incidental relevance to large companies." Manne, Our Two Corpo-
ration Systems: Law and Economics, 53 Va. L. REV. 259, 284 (1967). See also ABA MODEL
Bus. CORP. ACT. ANN. § 35, Special Comment at 756 (2d ed. 1971).
12. The difficulty of defining the close corporation and drawing a sharp line between it and
the public-issue corporation accounts, in part, for the failure to limit the application of some
of the new statutes to close corporations. See notes 9-10 supra and accompanying text.
13. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 402(b) (McKinney 1963).
14. E.g., id. § 601(c); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.15 (Page 1964).
15. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 22-801 (1970); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157A6 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1972); MICH. Cohie. LAws ANN. § 450.3 (1967); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.44 (1957). See
also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.04(A) (Page Supp. 1971) (statute allows incorporation by
a single person, not necessarily a natural person). One commentator has stated: "These enact-
ments should go far in overcoming the notorious practices of employing dummy or accommo-
dation incorporators and directors, and of recording and certifying minutes of meetings that
are not held. These are moves in the direction of bringing the laws into conformity with
practice." Spoerri, One Incorporator-One Director, 19 Bus. LAW. 305, 308 (1963). For the
view that such statutes do not go far enough to accomplish their purposes and that perpetuation
of existing practices in regard to the one-man corporation may be simpler, see Folk, supra note
II, at 878; Garrett, John Doe Incorporates Himself, 19 Bus. LAW. 535 (1964); Spoerri,
Business Corporations: Statutory Developments in 1964 and 1965, 21 Bus. LAW. 1079, 1080
(1966).
16. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (Supp. 1968); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-702(a)
(1970); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.34 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972); OHio REV. CODE ANN.
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shareholder and director action; 17 (5) relax the requirements of formal
corporate meetings and permit directors and shareholders to act by
unanimous written consent;" (6) allow directors to meet by telephone
conference. 9
Other statutory provisions that may be useful to close corpora-
tions effect the following: (1) authorize restrictions on the transfer of
stock;2" (2) empower directors to fix their own compensation as direc-
tors and officers; 21 (3) sanction shareholder agreements which im-
pinge upon powers, traditionally within the province of the board of
directors or which otherwise depart in important respects from the
traditional pattern of corporate management;22 (4) permit charter
provisions which restrict the discretion of directors or provide that the
shareholders shall manage the corporation;2 3 (5) permit special con-
tractual arrangements among the shareholders that provide when and
under what circumstances the corporation will be dissolved or set up
nonstatutory dissolution procedures; 4 (6) authorize judicial dissolu-
tion of a corporation in the event of deadlock among the shareholders
§ 1701.56(A) (Page Supp. 1971). These statutes provide that where the corporation has less
than three shareholders, the number of directors may be less than three but not less than the
number of shareholders.
A 1966 amendment to the Kentucky corporation statute permits a corporation, irrespective
of the number of its shareholders, to have a one-man board of directors. KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 271.345 (1969).
17. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 22-609 (1970); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 103 (Supp. 1971);
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 616, 709 (McKinney 1963); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 180.28, 180,35
(1957).
18. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 22-603 (1970); MICH. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 450.13 (1967). See
also N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 404(b) (McKinney 1963), providing that any action permitted to
be taken at the organization meeting of the incorporator or incorporators may be taken without
a meeting if each incorporator or his attorney-in-fact signs an instrument setting forth the
action so taken.
19. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1008(E) (Supp. 1972).
20. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 501(g) (West 1955); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 101 (Supp.
1971); TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.22 (1956), as amended, (Supp. 1971), The Delaware
statute expressly authorizes first options, buy-sell agreements, consent restraints, absolute pro-
hibitions against transfers to designated persons or classes of persons, restraints which preserve
Subchapter S election, and "any other lawful restriction on transfer . DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 202 (Supp. 1968).
21. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.60 (Page 1964); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.31 (1957).
22. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 22-611 (1970); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 620 (McKinney 1953);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-68 (1965).
23. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:5-21(2) (1969) (such a provision is permitted if provided
for in the original certificate of incorporation or if authorized by amendment to the certificate
by all shareholders).
24. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125(3) (1965); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-36.74 (1965).
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or directors (so-called "dissolution on deadlock" statutes); 2 (7) au-
thorize court appointment of a provisional director for a corporation
with a board of directors that is evenly divided on management poli-
cies.2
STATUTES FOCUSING ON CLOSE CORPORATIONS
Perhaps the earliest statute avowedly passed to meet the special
needs of close corporations was section 9 of the New York Stock
Corporation Law, enacted in 1948.27 That statute authorized charter
provisions fixing high quorums for shareholders' and directors' meet-
ings and requiring high votes for shareholder and director action.
Thereafter, organizers of New York close corporations, through the
use of high quorum and high vote requirements, could protect minor-
ity shareholders by giving them power to veto corporate decisions.
Section 9 was hailed at the time of its passage as the first important
legislative recognition of the special management needs of close cor-
porations. 2
The first really extensive and imaginative statutory innovations
on close corporations were included in the North Carolina Business
Corporation Act, enacted in 1955.29 The commission which drafted
that act made a diligent study of the peculiarities of close corpora-
tions, and many sections of the Act (although not limited in applica-
tion to close corporations) were designed to meet the special needs
of close corporations. Elvin R. Latty was a member of the commis-
sion and its principal draftsman."
Two pioneering sections of the North Carolina Act deserve spe-
25. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 4650-51 (West 1955); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 157.86
(Smith-Hurd 1954), as amended, (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A-12-7
(1969).
26. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 819 (West 1955), as amended, (West Supp. 1972); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 351.323 (1966).
27. Ch. 862, § 1, [1948] Laws of New York 1704. This statutory section has been su-
perseded by N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 616, 709 (McKinney 1963).
28. See De Capriles & Reichardt, 1947-1948 Survey of New York Law- Corporations, 23
N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 747 (1948). Actually, high quorum and high vote requirements had been
authorized in a number of states at an earlier date. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 816 (West 1955)
(enacted in 1947); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(4) (1953) (enacted in 1935).
29. N.C. GEN. STATS. §§ 55-1 to-175 (1965). For other legislation taking a novel approach
to problems of close corporations, see P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 14, § 1102(c) (1962). For an early
legislative proposal covering in detail the special problems of close corporations, see Winer,
supra note 5, at 335-43 (1943).
30. See Latty, supra note 9; Latty, Powers & Breckenridge, The Proposed North Carolina
Business Corporation Act, 33 N.C.L. REv. 26, 45, 51-52 (1954).
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cial attention. One of these sections3 contains the following provi-
sions: (1) a contract between two or more shareholders to vote their
shares as a unit for the election of directors shall be enforceable
between the parties for as long as 10 years, if it is in writing and
signed by the parties; (2) in a corporation whose shares are not gener-
ally traded in the markets, a written agreement to which all the
shareholders have assented (whether embodied in the charter or by-
laws or in a side agreement signed by all the parties) and which relates
to any phase* of the corporation's affairs shall not be invalidated on
the ground that its effect is to make the parties partners among
themselves; and (3) an agreement among some or all of the sharehold-
ers in a corporation, whether made solely among themselves or be-
tween one or more of them and a nonshareholder, is not invalid as
between the parties on the ground that it interferes with the discretion
of the board of directors; but by making such an agreement, the
shareholders who are parties assume the same liability as directors
for managerial acts.32
The other section 33 authorizes judicial liquidation of a corpora-
tion in an action by a shareholder if the corporation's charter or any
other written agreement among all the shareholders entitles the com-
plaining shareholder to liquidation or dissolution at will, or on the
occurrence of events which have taken place. 4
The South Carolina Business Corporation Act,35 passed in 1962,
also focuses on the close corporation. The reporter of the draft ver-
sion of that act stated that one of the principal guidelines of the
draftsmen was the desire to permit shareholders in a close corpora-
tion to act in the corporation's internal affairs almost as freely as if
they were involved in a partnership.36
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73 (1965).
32. See also id. § 55-24(a), which reads as follows: "Subject to the provisions of the charter,
the bylaws or agreements between the shareholders otherwise lawful, the business and affairs
of a corporation shall be managed by a board of directors" (emphasis added).
33. Id. §55-125(a).
34. For a discussion of several other sections of the North Carolina act which are particu-
larly applicable to close corporations, see Latty, supra note 9. For a discussion of amendments
to the North Carolina act designed to strengthen shareholders' agreements, see Comments on
North Carolina 1959 Session Laws, 38 N.C.L. REV. 154, 159-61 (1960).
35. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 12-11.1 to -31.2 (Supp. 1971). For a discussion of provisions in this
statute applicable to close corporations, see Myers, The Close Corporation Under the New
South Carolina Law, 16 S.C.L. REV. 577 (1964).
36. Folk, supra note 9, at 281. Draftsmen of future corporation laws would do well to
consult the comprehensive and clearly written Reporter's Notes to the draft version of the
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One section of the South Carolina statute,37 designed to deal with
dissension and deadlock in close corporations, gives the courts power
to liquidate a corporation in an action brought by a shareholder
whenever: (1) the directors are so divided respecting management
that the votes required for action by the board of directors cannot be
obtained, and the shareholders are unable to terminate the division,
with the consequence that the corporation is suffering or will suffer
irreparable injury, or the business and affairs of the corporation can
no longer be conducted to the advantage of the shareholders gener-
ally; (2) the shareholders are so divided that they have failed, for a
period which includes at least two consecutive annual meeting dates,
to elect successors to directors whose terms have expired or would
have expired upon the qualification of their successors; (3) the share-
holders are so divided respecting management that the corporation
is suffering or will suffer irreparable injury or the affairs of the corpo-
ration can no longer be conducted to the advantage of all the share-
holders; (4) the acts of the directors or those in control of the corpora-
tion are illegal, fraudulent, dishonest, oppressive, or unfairly prejudi-
cial either to the corporation or to any shareholder; (5) corporate
assets are being misapplied or wasted; or (6) the petitioning share-
holder has a right under the articles of incorporation to dissolution
of the corporation at will or upon the occurrence of a specified event
or contingency.
Another section of the statutes allows the courts unusually broad
remedial powers. It provides that, in an action filed by a shareholder
to dissolve the corporation on the dissension and deadlock grounds
discussed above, the court may make such order or grant such relief
as it deems appropriate. This relief may include an order (1) cancel-
ling or altering any provision contained in the corporation's articles
or by-laws; (2) cancelling, altering, or enjoining any resolution or
other act of the corporation; (3) directing or prohibiting any act of
the corporation or of shareholders, directors, officers, or other per-
sons party to the action; or (4) providing for the purchase at their fair
South Carolina Act. For additional material indicating that the draftsmen of the South Car-
olian statute were giving special attention to the problems of the small, closely held business,
see S.C. JUDICIAL COUNCIL, S.C. Bus. CORP. ACT ix-x (1961 Draft).
37. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-22.15(a) (Supp. 1971).
38. Id. § 12-22.23. This provision was taken from Companies Act, II & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38,
§ 210 (1948). As the reporter for the South Carolina act points out, section 210 of the English
act "has not been invoked, in any reported case or known litigation, with respect to a publicly
owned corporation, and indeed it is appropriate only to the closely held enterprise." S.C.
JUDICIAL COUNCIL, supra note 36, at 266.
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value of shares of any shareholder, either by the corporation or the
other shareholders. The section goes on to state that such relief may
be granted as an alternative to a decree of dissolution or may be
afforded whenever the circumstances of the case are such that relief,
rather than dissolution, would be appropriate. This provision gives
a court broad power to adjust its decree to the particular problem
before it, and thus to provide an adequate and lasting solution. In
the absence of a statute, most courts in this country have not felt that
they possessed such broad powers.
The New York Business Corporation Law,39 enacted in 1961 and
effective in 1963, although oriented primarily toward public-issue
corporations, has an extensive array of close corporation provisions.
One of the most important provisions of the statute permits written
shareholder agreements requiring that the shares held by the parties
to the agreement be voted in a prescribed manner and validates,
subject to certain conditions, terms in the certificate of incorporation
restricting the management powers of the board of directors in favor
of shareholder control." A provision for shareholder control of the
39. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW (McKinney 1963). See Ch. 855 [1961] Laws of New York. Only
a few of the Act's more significant provisions will be discussed in detail here. For further
discussion of the provisions in the New York Business Corporation Law designed for the close
corporation, see Hoffman, supra note 9; Stevens, Close Corporations and the New York
Business Corporation Law of 1961, 11 BUFFALO L. REv. 481 (1962); 75 HARV. L. REV. 852
(1962). See also Hetherington, Trends in Legislation for Close Corporations: A Comparison
of the Wisconsin Business Corporation Law of 1951 and the New York Busines Corporation
Law of 1961, 1963 Wis. L. REV. 92; Latty, Some General Observations on the New Business
Corporation Law of New York, I I BUFFALO L. REV. 591, 600-03 (1962).
40. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 620(a)-(c) (McKinney 1963), which provides:
(a) An agreement between two or more shareholders, if in writing and signed by
the parties thereto, may provide that in exercising any voting rights, the shares held by
them shall be voted as therein provided, or as they may agree, or as determined in
accordance with a procedure agreed upon by them.
(b) A provision in the certificate of incorporation otherwise prohibited by law
because it improperly restricts the board in its management of the business of the
corporation, or improperly transfers to one or more shareholders or to one or more
persons or corporations to be selected by him or them, all or any part of such manage-
ment othewise within the authority of the board under this chapter, shall nevertheless
be valid:
(I) If all the incorporators or holders of record of all outstanding shares,
whether or not having voting power, have authorized such provision in the certifi-
cate of incorporation or an amendment thereof; and
(2) If, subsequent to the adoption of such provision, shares are transferred
or issued only to persons who had knowledge or notice thereof or consented in
writing to such provision.
(c) A provision authorized by paragraph (b) shall be valid only so long as no shares
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management of the corporation relieves the directors from the liabil-
ity for managerial acts or omissions which is ordinarily imposed on
directors and imposes that liability upon the shareholders authorizing
the provision or consenting to it to the extent that and so long as the
discretion or powers of the board are controlled by the provision.4'
The New York Business Corporation Law also contains a provi-
sion that makes shareholders in a close corporation-but not share-
holders in a public-issue corporation-liable for certain obligations
owed by the corporation to its employees.12 Before the passage of the
Business Corporation Law, New York imposed upon shareholders
unlimited liability for debts, wages, and salaries (including "fringe
benefits") which the corporation owed employees.4 3 In other words,
the state made an important exception to the principle that share-
holders are shielded from unlimited liability and risk only the funds
they invest in the enterprise. While the Business Corporation Law
retains shareholder liability for employee claims, it imposes this lia-
bility only on the ten largest shareholders in a corporation with no
shares listed on a national securities exchange or quoted in an over-
the-counter market by one or more members of a national securities
association or its affiliate.
One piece of federal legislation which singled out the close corpo-
ration for special treatment warrants brief mention. Subchapter S44
of the Internal Revenue Code permits small business corporations
that meet specified requirements to elect a special tax status in many
respects similar to that of a partnership. Among the requirements for
of the corporation are listed on a national securities exchange or regularly quoted in an
over-the-counter market by one or more members of a national or affiliated securities
association.
Another section requires the existence of a provision authorized by paragraph (b) to be noted
conspicuously on the face or back of every share certificate issued. Id. § 602(g).
41. Id. § 620(0.
42. Id. § 630.
43. See Rogers & McManus, Stockholders' Booby-Trap: Partnership Liabilities Under
Section 71, New York Stock Corporation Law, 28 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1149 (1953).
44. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1371-77. Subchapter S was added to the Internal Revenue
Code by the Technical Amendments Act of 1958 and was originally enacted as Act of Sept. 2,
1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 64, 72 Stat. 1650. See generally Anthoine, Federal Tax Legislation
of 1958: The Corporate Election and Collapsible Amendment, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1146 (1958);
Bittker & Eustice, Corporate Elections Under Subchapter S, 39 COLO. L. REV. 1 (1966); Patty,
Qualification and Disqualification Under Subchapter S, N.Y.U. 18TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 661
(1960); Sherfy, Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code, 2 CORP. PRAC. COMMENTATOR I
(No. 3, 1960); Swietlik, Subchapter S: What Is It and How Does It Work?, 44 MARQ. L. REV.
470 (1961).
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eligibility to elect this status are that the corporation be a domestic
corporation, that it have only one class of stock, and that it have ten
shareholders or less. Obviously, a public-issue corporation cannot
qualify; many, if not most, close corporations can.
THE INTEGRATED CLOSE CORPORATION STATUTES
The First Integrated Close Corporation Statute
In 1963 Florida became the first state to enact a separate, inte-
grated close corporation statute.5 The Florida statute is permissive,"
allowing a close corporation, which is defined as "a corporation for
profit whose shares of stock are not generally traded in the markets
maintained by securities dealers or brokers,"4 to elect either to be
governed by its provisions or to remain subject to the law applicable
generally to corporations. The statute specifically states that acquisi-
tion of all of a corporation's shares by less than three shareholders
will not render the corporation dormant or impair its existence.48
The Florida statute sanctions informal actions by directors and
shareholders without the holding of formal meetings if written con-
sent to such actions is gained from all persons who would be entitled
to vote upon them. 9 Furthermore, a charter clause providing for the
management of a close corporation's business by the shareholders
rather than by a board of directors is permissible under this statute.
The statute also provides that shareholders of a close corporation
may enter into an agreement-embodied in the articles of incorpora-
tion, in the by-laws, or in a written side agreement signed by all of
the parties-which relates to any phase of the corporation's affairs.'
The Florida law further states that a written agreement of this kind
shall not be invalid as between the parties on the ground that it is an
attempt by the parties to treat the corporation as if it were a partner-
ship or to arrange their relationships in a manner that would be
characteristic of a partnership,- or, if the corporation is managed by
a board of directors, on the ground that it so relates to the conduct
45. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 608.70-.77 (Supp. 1972).
46. Id. § 608.70(I).
47. Id. § 608.70(2).
48. Id. § 608.71(1).
49. Id. §§ 608.73 -.74.
50. Id. § 608.72.
51. Id. § 608.75(I).
52. Id. § 608.75(2).
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of the corporation's affairs as to interfere with the discretion of the
board of directors.53 However, such an agreement has the effect of
relieving the directors of liability for managerial acts and imposing
that liability upon those shareholders who are parties to the agree-
ment.54 The statute contains a provision giving the shareholders of
a close corporation who are entitled to elect a director of the corp-
oration the authority "at any time [to] remove such director, with
or without cause, by like action of the stockholders as required
for the election of such director absent a contrary provision by agree-
ment or in the by-laws or articles of incorporation." 5 Finally, the law
contains a typical provision for dissolution-on-deadlock, authorizing
a court to dissolve a close corporation when the directors or share-
holders are deadlocked, and arbitration or any other remedy provided
for in writing by the shareholders has failed to break the impasse."
The Florida statute is brief; its eight sections contain little that
does not appear in other corporation statutes. In large part, the Flor-
ida statute merely assimilates provisions which appear in a somewhat
different form scattered throughout the North Carolina Business
Corporation Act.57 The Florida provisions, however, are not so well
drafted as those incorporated in the North Carolina Act. In fact, the
Florida statute contains a great deal of ambiguous language and
leaves unanswered many questions of importance to close corpora-
tions." In view of these limitations and defects, the Florida close
corporation statute is not likely to have a significant influence on the
development of close corporation legislation.
53. Id. § 608.75(3).
54. Id.
55. Id. § 608.76.
56. Id. § 608.77.
57. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-1 to -175 (1965). For a discussion of the North Carolina-act,
see notes 29-34 supra and accompanying text.
58. For a discussion of the uncertainties under the Florida statute "as to what corporations
are governed by its provisions and what powers such corporations may possess," see Dickson,
The Florida Close Corporation Act: An Experiment That Failed, 21 U. MIAMi L. REV. 842
(1967). For further discussion of the Florida statute, see Note, Statutory Recognition of the
Close Corporation in Florida, 16 U. FLA. L. REV. 569 (1964). For a brief comparison of the
Florida statute with provisions in the New York and North Carolina statutes, see 77 HARV. L.
REV. 1551 (1964). For a comparison of the Florida statute with the close corporation provisions
of Delaware and New York, see Comment, A Comparison of the Close Corporation Statutes
of Delaware, Florida and New York, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV. 515 (1969).
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More Recent Close Corporation Legislation
In 1967 Delaware" and Maryland"0 enacted close corporation
statutes. The framers of the two statutes took entirely different ap-
proaches to the problems of close corporations;6 however, both stat-
utes have innovative and forward-looking features, and undoubtedly
will be carefully studied in the future by draftsmen of close corpora-
tion legislation. The Delaware plan has been adopted, with only
minor modifications, by Pennsylvania in 196862 and by Kansas in
1972.63
The Delaware Plan. The Delaware close corporation statute is in
the form of a separate subchapter of the state's General Corporation
Law. 4 A close corporation is defined in this subchapter as a corpora-
tion whose charter provides that (1) its outstanding stock shall be held
by not more than a specified number of persons, not to exceed thirty;
(2) all of its stock shall be subject to one or more restrictions on
transfer; and (3) it shall make no "public offering" of its stock.6 A
corporation that meets these requirements can elect to become a
"close corporation" and be subject to the provisions of the close
corporation subchapter, or it can remain subject to the other provi-
sions of the General Corporation Law.6
Under the terms of the Delaware statute a close corporation's
59. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 341-56 (Supp. 1968).
60. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, §§ 100-11 (Supp. 1971).
61. For an excellent article comparing the statutes, see Bradley, A Comparative Evalua-
tion, supra note 6 (concluding that the Maryland statute is "the best close corporation statute
to date," id. at 554). For a discussion of the Maryland close corporation statute, see Hall, The
New Maryland Close Corporation Law, 27 MD. L. REv. 341 (1967).
62. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1371-86 (Supp. 1972).
63. 3 P-H CORP. (Kan.) §§ 125-40 (1972).
64. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 341-56 (Supp. 1968).
65. Id. § 342(a). As Professor Bradley points out, workable close corporation legislation
is available to a corporation in Delaware, irrespective of the number of its shareholders or
whether its stock is subject to transfer restrictions or has been offered for sale publicly, because
under the Delaware General Corporation Law, a corporation, even though it does not qualify
under the close corporation subchapter, will have or may be given the following characteristics:
a board of directors consisting of only one member (§ 141(b)); high director quorum and vote
requirements (§ 141(b)); informal director action (§ 141()); broad delegation to committees
(§ 141(c)); selection of corporate officers and agents by the shareholders (§ 142(a)-(b)); stock
transfer restrictions of the most stringent variety (§ 202); irrevocable proxies (§ 212); high
shareholder quorum and voting requirements (§ 216); voting trusts and other voting agreements
(§ 218); informal shareholder action (§ 228); liberal dissolution of joint venture corporations
(§ 273); dissolution upon deadlock (§ 226). Bradley, A Comparative Evaluation, supra note 6,
at 533.
66. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 341(a) (Supp. 1968).
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charter must contain a heading which states the name of the corpora-
tion and the fact that it is a close corporation.67 Furthermore, the
charter may contain a section setting forth the qualifications of its
shareholders, either by specifying those classes of persons who shall
be entitled to become shareholders or by denoting those classes of
persons who shall not be entitled to become shareholders. 8 In addi-
tion, a corporation already in existence under the regular provisions
of the General Corporation Law, if it meets the close corporation
requirements, can become a close corporation by means of a charter
amendment-approved by the holders of two-thirds of each class of
its stock-stating that it elects to become a close corporation.69
To insure that a close corporation's stock can be subjected to an
effective restriction on transferability, the Delaware close corpora-
tion statute, after referring to a provision of the General Corporation
Law authorizing restrictions on the transferability of corporate
stock,70 provides that if a restriction on the transfer of the stock of a
close corporation is held to be unauthorized, the corporation shall
nonetheless have an option for thirty days to acquire the restricted
stock at a price agreed upon by the parties, or, if no such agreement
can be reached, at the fair value of the stock as determined by the
Court of Chancery. 7' The close corporation status of a company will
be involuntarily terminated if an event occurs which breaches one or
more of the charter conditions necessary to qualify it as a close
corporation, and the company or its shareholders "within thirty days
after the occurrence of the event, or within thirty days after the event
has been discovered, whichever is later" do not take whatever steps
are necessary to correct the breach.7 2 In addition, a Delaware corpo-
ration may voluntarily terminate its status as a close corporation
through a charter amendment approved by the holders of two-thirds
of each class of stock,73 unless the charter requires a higher vote.74
The Delaware close corporation subchapter contains a number of
provisions dealing with management and control of the close corpora-
67. Id. § 343(a).
68. Id. § 342(b).
69. Id. § 344.
70. Id. § 202.
71. Id. § 349.
72. Id. § 348(a).(b).
73. Id. § 346(a).
74. Id. § 346(b).
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tion. One of the sections 75 expressly provides that a written agreement
made by the holders of a majority of a close corporation's outstand-
ing voting stock, whether solely among themselves or with a person
not a shareholder, is not invalid, as among the parties to the agree-
ment, on the ground that it restricts the discretion or powers of the
board of directors. Such an agreement has the effect of relieving the
directors of liability for managerial acts and imposing that liability
upon shareholders who are parties to the agreement." Another sec-
tion7 allows a close corporation's charter to provide that the corpora-
tion's business shall be managed by the shareholders instead of by a
board of directors, with the shareholders becoming subject to all the
liabilities of directors. However, a provision of this kind can be in-
serted in the charter by amendment only if all the shareholders,
whether or not otherwise entitled to vote, approve it.78 Such a provi-
sion can be deleted from the charter only if the holders of a majority
of all the corporation's outstanding shares of stock, whether or not
otherwise entitled to vote, vote in favor of deletion. 79 A third section
of this statute"0 provides that no written agreement "among stock-
holders" (whether this means any two, a majority, or all is not clear),
nor any provision of the charter or by-laws relating to any phase of
the corporation's affairs (including but not limited to management of
its business, declaration and payment of dividends or other division
of profits, the election of directors or officers, the employment of
shareholders, or the arbitration of disputes) shall be invalid on the
ground that it is an attempt by the parties to treat the corporation
as if it were a partnership or an effort to arrange relations among the
shareholders or between the corporation and the shareholders in a
manner that would be characteristic of a partnership.
The Delaware close corporation statute, moreover, gives the
Court of Chancery power to appoint a custodian" or a provisional
director" for a close corporation whose directors (or shareholders, if
the corporation is managed by shareholders instead of by a board of
directors) are so divided respecting the management of the corpora-
75. Id. § 350.
76. Id.
77. Id. § 351.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. § 354.
81. Id. § 352(a).
82. Id. § 353(a).
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tion's business and affairs that the votes required for corporate action
cannot be obtained, and as a result, the business of the corporation
is either suffering from or is threatened with irreparable injury, or can
no longer be conducted to the advantage of the shareholders gener-
ally. Finally, this statute provides that a close corporation's charter
may include a provision granting to any shareholder, or to the holders
of a specified number or percentage of shares, an option to have the
corporation dissolved at will or upon the occurrence of a specified
event or contingency; 3 the charter may be amended to include such
a provision by an affirmative vote of all the shareholders, whether or
not otherwise entitled to vote, unless the charter specifically author-
izes such an amendment by a lower vote of not less than two-thirds
of the shareholders, whether or not otherwise entitled to vote.84
The Maryland Approach. The Maryland close corporation stat-
ute defines a close corporation for its purposes as a corporation
whose charter contains a statement declaring that it is a close corpo-
ration. Such a statement may either be contained in the original
corporate charter or be included in the charter by means of an
amendment approved by all of the corporation's shareholders.8 6 Mar-
yland also requires that a clear reference to the fact that the corpora-
tion is a close corporation appear prominently at the top of the
charter document and upon each certificate of the corporation's
stock.87 However, the failure of any charter document or stock certifi-
cate to contain such a reference will not affect the corporation's
status as a close corporation.8s
This statute does not prescribe requirements for a corporation's
eligibility for close corporation status based on either the number of
shareholders which the corporation has or the extent of trading in its
shares. However, the statute does prohibit a close corporation from
having outstanding: (1) any securities which are convertible into
stock; (2) any voting securities other than stock; or (3) any transfera-
ble options, warrants, or other rights to subscribe for or purchase any
of its stock. 9
The Maryland close corporation statute is characterized by a
83. Id. § 355(a).
84. Id. § 355(b).
85. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 100(a) (Supp. 1971).
86. Id.
87. Id. § 100(c).
88. Id.
89. Id. § 102(b).
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consistent requirement of unanimous shareholder approval for action
that installs or modifies structural or management arrangements of
fundamental importance. As noted above, unanimity is required to
amend a corporation's charter to elect close corporation status. Simi-
larly, such status, once elected, cannot be abandoned except by unani-
mous consent.90 Moreover, a transfer of a close corporation's shares
is invalid unless it is consented to by all of the shareholders or is made
pursuant to an agreement entered into by all of the shareholders."
Further, in order to sell or issue additional shares of its stock, a close
corporation in Maryland must first obtain the approval of the holders
of all outstanding shares unless an agreement among its shareholders
provides otherwise. 2 In addition, a shareholders' agreement regulat-
ing either the corporation's affairs or the relations of the shareholders
cannot be amended except by the unanimous written consent of all
shareholders then parties to the agreement. 3 Finally, approval of all
of the shareholders is required for consolidation, merger, sale, lease,
or exchange of all or substantially all of the corporation's assets. 4
The Maryland statute also makes it very clear that whenever it re-
quires the consent of all of the shareholders for designated corporate
action, the consent of holders of shares which otherwise do not have
voting rights, or have only limited voting rights, must be obtained as
well as the consent of holders of shares with full voting rights."
Like the Delaware statute, the Maryland close corporation stat-
ute contains a number of provisions dealing with management and
control. One of its sections" permits an agreement among all of the
shareholders regulating any aspect of the corporation's affairs or the
relations of the shareholders, so long as it is embodied in the charter,
by-laws, or in a written instrument signed by all of the shareholders.
An agreement of this type may be enforced by an injunction or "by
such other relief as the court may determine to be fair and appropri-
90. Id. § 100(b).
91. Id. § 101(a). However, unless otherwise provided by a shareholders' agreement, a share-
holder is entitled to dissolve the corporation if he makes a written request for permission to
transfer his shares and such consent is not given within thirty days, or if a party obligated to
purchase his shares under a shareholders' agreement defaults and such default is not cured
within thirty days. Id. § 101(b).
92. Id. § 102(a).
93. Id. § 104(b).
94. Id.§ 110.
95. Id. § 103(a).
96. Id. § 104(a).
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ate in the circumstances." In appropriate cases a court may, upon
the motion of a party to such an agreement, order dissolution of the
corporation." This section also expressly states that nothing in it
"shall affect otherwise valid agreements among stockholders of a
close or other corporation."99 Another section of the statute estab-
lishes that a close corporation's charter may provide that it will
have no board of directors, in which case the corporation's business
and affairs shall be managed by direct action of the shareholders,
exercising all of the powers given to the directors by the Maryland
Stock Corporation Law.' 0 Such an arrangement has the effect of
subjecting the shareholders to liabilities imposed upon directors by
the Stock Corporation Law 1' and also imposes upon shareholders
responsibility to take any action formerly required to be taken by
the board of directors. 10 2
The Maryland close corporation statute also deals with a number
of other important matters. For example, it provides that an annual
meeting of the shareholders need not be held unless requested by a
shareholder.' 3 In addition, the law states that a close corporation,
if it chooses to have a board of directors, may fix the number of its
directors at the level it desires, notwithstanding any provision in the
Stock Corporation Law to the contrary.' 4 Furthermore, under the
terms of this statute, any shareholder in a close corporation may,
during the usual business hours, inspect and copy in person or
through his agent or attorney the by-laws, minutes of shareholders'
or directors' proceedings, annual statements concerning the corpora-
tion's affairs, the stock ledger, the corporation's books of account,
and any other records or documents of the corporation relevant to
its business and affairs. 5 Once every calendar year, any shareholder
of a close corporation may require the corporate officers to provide
him with a financial statement setting out in reasonable detail the
corporation's assets and liabilities as of a reasonably current date.'
97. Id. § 104(d).
98. Id.
99. Id. § 104(e).
100. Id. § 105(a)(1).
101. Id. § 105(c)(1).
102. Id. § 105(a)(2).
103. Id. § 107.
104. Id. § 106.
105. Id. § 108(a).
106. Id. § 108(b).
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Moreover, a shareholder of a close corporation in Maryland may
petition a court of equity for dissolution of the corporation on the
ground that "there is such internal dissension among the stockholders
of the corporation that the business and affairs of the corporation can
no longer be conducted to the advantage of the stockholders gener-
ally."'' 17 However, any one or more shareholders of the corporation
desiring to avoid dissolution may do so by electing to purchase the
shares owned by the party petitioning for dissolution at a price equal
to their fair value.'"' If the shareholders concerned cannot agree on
the fair value of the shares in question, the Maryland statute provides
that the court considering the petition for dissolution will determine
their value." 9
SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE CLOSE CORPORATION LEGISLATION
Remove Unnecessary Restrictions on Participants' Contractual
Freedom
The statutes that have been enacted to meet the needs of close
corporations have some serious defects. In the first place, many of
the statutes designed for close corporations still impose undesirable
restrictions on the freedom of the participants to set up a control
pattern that allocates management powers in a manner in which they
desire."0 Statutory changes, it is true, have generally been permissive
and "enabling," tending to give close corporation participants greater
freedom to tailor a control pattern to meet the needs of the business
and their own wishes; however, questionable restrictions on the par-
ticipants' contractual freedom remain.
Some statutes, for instance, seem to be characterized by the no-
tion that an important control arrangement is not to be given effect,
107. Id. § 109(a).
108. Id. § 109(c).
109. Id.
110. See Bradley, Towards A More Perfect Close Corporation, supra note 6, where the
author examines the control arrangements that associates in close corporations typically utilize,
and points out various respects in which present statutes restrict the use of these arrangements.
See also Herwitz, Allocation of Stock Between Services and Capital in the Organization of a
Close Corporation, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1098, 1109-10 (1962), where the author notes that "a
flat bar against the issuance of stock for future services is particularly unwarranted in the ease
of the close corporation" but that no legislative exception to the rule against issuing stock for
future services has been made for the close corporation.
No legislature seems to have struggled as yet with the problem of what control a shareholder
in a close corporation should be allowed to exert over corporate action after his death through
testamentary directions as to the voting of shares.
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even among shareholders who agree to it, unless it is embodied in the
corporation's charter."' Under such a statute, inclusion of a control
arrangement in the by-laws or in a shareholders' agreement, even one
to which all participants are parties, will not suffice. Thus, the New
York statute authorizes high quorum requirements for shareholders'
and directors' meetings and high vote requirements for shareholder
and director action, but only if these requirements are placed in the
charter."2 That statute also indicates that an arrangement "otherwise
prohibited by law because it improperly restricts the board [of direc-
tors] in its management of the business . . . or improperly transfers
to one or more shareholders or to one or more persons or corpora-
tions to be selected by him or them, all or any part of such manage-
ment . . . shall nevertheless be valid" if embodied in the charter of
a close corporation with the approval of all of the shareholders.
However, the statute does not sanction arrangements included only
in the by-laws or in a shareholders' agreement" 3
Experience has shown that where statutes require designated
kinds of control arrangements to be embodied in the charter in order
to be effective, the participants nevertheless often bargain among
themselves for such control arrangements but fail to insure that the
schemes are implemented by appropriate charter provisions. Perhaps
this result sometimes occurs because the attorney representing the
participants is unsophisticated in matters of corporate law and simply
is not aware of the statutory requirements. In any event, the effect is
that important contract rights cannot be enforced, the objectives of
the contracting parties are frustrated, and minority participants are
deprived of protection for which they bargained."' Restrictive stat-
utes should be amended to provide for enforcement of by-law provi-
sions and shareholders' agreements allocating control in a close
corporation, whether or not the arrangements are embodied in the
charter, at least so long as shareholders who have not consented to
I 1l. E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 42(b) (1957); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:5-11(1) (1969);
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 616 (McKinney 1963), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1970).
112. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 616 (McKinney 1963), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1970).
113. Id. § 620(b).
114. See, e.g., Fromkin v. Merrall Realty, Inc., 30 Misc. 2d 288, 215 N.Y.S.2d 525 (1961),
affd 15 App. Div. 2d 919, 225 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1962) (shareholders' agreement forbidding sale
of corporation's assets except by unanimous consent held invalid although statute authorized
unanimity requirement if embodied in charter); Prigerson v. White Cap Sea Foods, Inc., 100
N.Y.S.2d 881 (Sup. Ct. 1950) (by-law requiring shareholder unanimity held invalid although
statute authorized unanimity requirement if embodied in charter).
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the by-laws or who are not parties to an agreement do not complain
or are not prejudiced.
Another restriction on the contractual freedom of participants
occurs in statutes which limit shareholders' agreements to a period
of ten years." 5 Such a limitation on the term of a shareholders'
agreement may make it difficult for a person coming into a close
corporation in a minority position to contract for adequate protection
against the power normally held by majority shareholders under the
principle of majority rule. Often the first years of a business enter-
prise are lean years in which the business has to struggle to survive,
making little, if any, profit. If a shareholders' agreement is limited
to ten years, its effectiveness may lapse just as the business is develop-
ing into a highly profitable operation and seems assured of success
in the future-a stage in the development of an enterprise when ma-
jority shareholders may well be tempted to squeeze out a minority
shareholder (that is, eliminiate him as a co-owner of the business)."'
Shareholders' agreements probably have been limited in duration to
ten years in some states in an effort to conform to the ten-year
limitation generally applied to voting trusts;"' however, even assum-
ing that adequate reasons exist for limiting voting trusts to ten years
when they are employed in a public-issue corporation, there seems to
be no justification for such a limit on a shareholders' agreement used
in a close corporation, especially if all of the corporation's sharehold-
ers are parties."'
A highly useful arrangement for assuring shareholders in a close
corporation representation on its board of directors is to set up two
or more classes of stock, provide that each class is to vote for and
115. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-339 (1958), as amended, (Supp. 1972) (10
years with provisions for renewal provided all parties to the original agreement agree); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 55-73(a) (1965) (no provision for renewal); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 12-16.15,
.22(B)(3) (SuPP. 1971) (10 years with provision for renewal among concurring parties).
See also S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-16.14(g) (Supp. 1971) (prescribing a maximum life of ten
years for irrevocable proxies unless renewed for a period not to exceed ten years).
116. For a discussion of the techniques that are used to squeeze out a shareholder, see F.
H. O'NEAL & J. DERWIN, ExPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATES §§ 3.01-5.15
(1961).
117. See Folk, The Model Act and the South Carolina Corporation Law Revision, 18 Bus.
LAW. 351, 383 (1963).
118. "A close corporation statute should free all of these devices [voting trusts, shareholder
voting agreements, and irrevocable proxies] from any time limitation." Bradley, Towards a
More Perfect Close Corporation, supra note 6, at 1173. In some states the permissible duration
of voting trusts is now longer than ten years. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:5-20 (1969)
(twenty-one years).
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elect a specified number or a specified percentage of the directors,
and then issue each class to a different shareholder or faction of
shareholders. Thus, the holder of Class A might elect a Class A
director, the holder of Class B stock, a Class B director, and so on.
In some jurisdictions, the validity of this type of arrangement has not
been settled, probably because of legislative oversight. Corrective
legislation is needed in those jurisdictions to make absolutely clear
that this useful control arrangement is legal and is available for use
in close corporations.
Provide Self-Executing Protection for Minority Shareholders
The most serious defect of current close corporation legislation
is one of omission. Although most statutes validate special charter
and by-law provisions and shareholders' agreements designed to pro-
tect minority shareholders, no statute-not even any one of the sepa-
rate, integrated close corporation statutes-furnishes adequate self-
executing protection for minority shareholders who have failed to
bargain for special charter or by-law provisions or for protective
clauses in shareholders' agreements.' Since minority participants
in a close corporation may not anticipate dissension or oppression,
and indeed may be unaware of their vulnerability, they frequently
fail to bargain for adequate protection against mistreatment. 12 In
view of this widespread failure of minority shareholders to use self-
help, commentators and legislative draftsmen now might well turn
their attention to ways of providing automatic statutory protection.
Most of the modern statutes do deal in a limited way with situa-
tions in which the participants have failed to anticipate dissension or
oppression. Many statutes, for example, authorize judicial dissolu-
tion of a corporation if a deadlock occurs in its management.," A few
statutes permit the courts to appoint a provisional director to break
a deadlock. 22 Other statutes authorize the courts to dissolve a corpo-
119. The Maryland close corporation statute does protect a shareholder against basic
changes in the initial corporate setup by requiring unanimous shareholder approval for such
changes. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 100(b) (Supp. 1971).
120. See Hetherington, supra note 7, at 15-19.
121. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 4651 (West 1955); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-382(a)
(1958), as amended, (Supp. 1972); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226 (Supp. 1968); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 32, § 157.86 (Smith-Hurd 1954), as amended, (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 14A:12-7 (1969); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1104 (McKinney 1963); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-
125 (1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2107 (1967); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23A.28.170
(1969).
122. CAL. CORP. CODE § 819 (West 1955), as amended, (West Supp. 1972); DEL. CODE
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ration if the acts of the directors or those in control of it are fraudu-
lent or oppressive,'2 3 or to designate a custodian to manage a close
corporation in which a deadlock has developed.' The Maryland
close corporation statute permits judicial dissolution of a close corpo-
ration if "there is such internal dissension among the stockholders
• ..that the business and affairs of the corporation can no longer
be conducted to the advantage of the stockholders generally."' Stat-
utes permitting the courts to break management deadlocks or to
dissolve a corporation for fraud or oppression are gradually increas-
ing in number, but these statutes do not by themselves provide ade-
quate protection to the minority shareholder.
Professor Hetherington has suggested that a minority shareholder
in a close corporation, even though he has not bargained for the
privilege of withdrawing from the business, should nevertheless, if he
decides he wants to dispose of his interest, be able to liquidate his
investment on terms that will insure him of receiving a fair share of
the enterprise's accumulated earnings.' This result could be
achieved, he points out, by giving any shareholder either the right to
compel dissolution or the right to require the corporation or the other
shareholders to buy his shares at a "fair" price."'
Encourage Judicial Discrimination in Applying the Principle of
Majority Rule and the Business Judgment Rule
Legislatures might also try to break down the traditional reluct-
ance of American courts to intervene in the internal affairs of corpo-
rations when dissension develops among shareholders or when minor-
ity shareholders claim that they are suffering injustices. The two
ANN. tit. 8, § 353 (Supp. 1968) (applicable to close corporations only); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-
703 (1970); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.323 (1966); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1384 (Supp. 1972)
(applicable to close corporations only).
123. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.49(3) (1969); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.650 (1968); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.91 (Page Supp. 1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2107(A)(2) (1967).
124. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 352(a)(1) (Supp. 1968).
125. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 109(a) (Supp. 1971).
126. See Hetherington, supra note 7, at 22.
127. The latter alternative would require statutory provisions to permit the judicial
determination, if necessary, of price. Similarly, court supervision of the terms of pay-
ment, which could be extended over a period of months or years depending on the
circumstances, would prevent or mitigate the burden of raising a large amount of cash
over a short period of time that could otherwise fall on the purchasers. Finally, the other
shareholders could be given an option to dissolve the corporation in lieu of the purchase.
Most important, of course, the statutory liquidation right, like the partner's right to
compel dissolution, must be unconditional. Id.
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principal conceptual barriers to the courts' granting relief to ag-
grieved minority shareholders-the principle of majorit, rule in cor-
porate management and the business judgment rule-actually have
only limited validity in small business corporations. Apparently with-
out close examination, courts have long accorded the principle of
majority rule the same sanctity in corporate enterprises, including
small businesses, that the tenet enjoys in the political world. Yet,
many participants in closely held corporations are "little people,"
unsophisticated in business and financial matters. Not uncommonly,
a participant in a closely held enterprise invests all his assets in the
business with an expectation, often reasonable under the circumstan-
ces even in the absence of an express contract, that he will be a key
employee in the company and will have a voice in business decisions.
When courts apply the principle of majority rule in close corpora-
tions, they often disappoint the reasonable expectations of minority
participants.
The indiscriminate application of the business judgment rule to
sustain action of directors in a close corporation is also subject to
criticism. That rule seems to be grounded on the following ideas: (1)
shareholders have selected the directors to manage the business, and
the courts are not justified in substituting their judgment for that of
managers selected by the owners of the business; (2) directors' deci-
sions are based on complex business considerations and courts are
simply not qualified to make those decisions or to pass on their
propriety in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion; and (3) a heavy
burden should be placed on complaining shareholders in order to
discourage strike suits and frivolous litigation.
These justifications for the business judgment rule, however, do
not fully apply to the situation of a close corporation. Courts may
well consider intervention to protect minority shareholders in a close
corporation against oppressive action by the directors (unfair divi-
dend policies, for example), even though fraud, bad faith or, for that
matter, clear unreasonableness on the part of the directors cannot be
shown. Participants in a close corporation do not usually think of
themselves as delegating management of their corporation to an inde-
pendent board of directors; the board is often viewed as only a legal
formality. Insofar as the participants look into the future at the time
they organize a close corporation, they usually anticipate that the
owners will also be the managers. Minority shareholders expect to
share in management.
It hardly seems necessary in all cases to say, as the courts so often
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have ruled in effect, that a person who becomes a shareholder in a
corporation assumes a certain legal status with all of its built-in
liabilities, irrespective of his and his associates' intentions and expec-
tations. Furthermore, in a close corporation, where the business con-
siderations on which directors' decisions are based are likely to be
somewhat less intricate than in public-issue corporations and the
directors making the decisions are likely to be somewhat less astute,
there is less reason for courts to show an unquestioning deference to
decisions of the directors. Finally, the great practical danger of a too-
ready judicial interference with public-issue corporations-the dan-
ger of encouraging strike suits-is not present in close corporations
or at least not to the same degree.
A statute stating that shareholders in a close corporation, just as
partners in a firm, are to be held to strict fiduciary duties to each
other in the operation of the business and in their dealings among
themselves might provide some protection to minority shareholders.
Similarly, it might be helpful to have legislation that directs the
courts, even in the absence of an express agreement, to protect the
reasonable expectations of persons acquiring an interest in a close
corporation-for example, their expectation to participate in man-
agement or to be employed by the company. Further, draftsmen of
future close corporation legislation might consider methods of assur-
ing that victims of torts committed by close corporations are able to
recover their damages. For example, they might contemplate a statu-
tory provision which would impose on the shareholders personal lia-
bility for corporate torts unless the corporation had provided itself
with reasonably adequate liability insurance." 8
Provide Judicial Remedies that Give Long-Term Protection to
Minority Shareholders
Legislation to broaden the remedies available to the courts in
protecting minority shareholders also seems desirable. On the whole,
American courts have been singularly unresourceful in developing
remedies to assist minority shareholders. Of course, the courts have
compelled dishonest directors, officers, and majority shareholders to
restore assets appropriated from the corporation, and they have
sometimes set aside mergers and recapitalizations which were pat-
ently unfair to minority shareholders. On occasion they have even
128. See Comment, Should Shareholders Be Personally Liable for the Torts of Their
Corporations?, 76 YALE L.J. 1190 (1967).
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ordered the declaration of dividends when dividends were being with-
held to "squeeze out" minority shareholders. Remedies granted,
however, have been largely stopgap in nature, providing relief against
particularly flagrant acts by majority shareholders or by directors
and officers, but usually not protecting minority shareholders against
future oppression or new attempts at squeeze-outs. Courts generally
have failed to provide permanent solutions when selfish and aggres-
sive majority shareholders are searching for ways to oppress or elimi-
nate a minority. In many instances dissolution and liquidation of a
company does not benefit minority shareholders because the liquida-
tion value of the assets may be small or the only available purchasers
may be the very majority whose oppression drove the minority to
seek redress. Perhaps, when dealing with a dispute among the owners
of a close corporation, the courts should have, in addition to the
power to dissolve a deadlocked or dispute-wracked corporation, the
power to impose upon the parties whatever settlements they consider
just and equitable. This discretion probably should be unfettered,
because it is impossible to set forth a general guide to the solution of
what are essentially individual cases. Thus, a court should have power
to order the purchase of a shareholder's interest by the corporation
or the other shareholders or to make whatever order it considers
appropriate to regulate the future conduct of the corporation's af-
fairs." 9
129. Cf. Companies Act, II & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 210.(1948), which gives English courts
broad power of this kind. South Carolina was the first American state to adopt similar legisla-
tion. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-22.23 (Supp. 1971).
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